Artificial Intelligence Initiates a New Arms Race for the Visibility and Invisibility of Nuclear Weapons
The rapid development of artificial intelligence could undermine the foundation of nuclear non-proliferation that has been effective for decades, a new study suggests. The authors examine how emerging technology changes the risks associated with nuclear weapons and opens up a new, largely overlooked arms race for the visibility and invisibility of nuclear warheads.
At the center is the struggle between two technological trends. On one side are the so-called technologies that facilitate nuclear capabilities, lowering the threshold to acquire, design, or hide nuclear weapons and their production chains. Opposing them are technologies that enhance surveillance and detection, improving, for example, satellite monitoring, sensor networks, and intelligence analysis.
The study outlines this dichotomy and argues that the strategic dynamics of nuclear proliferation are increasingly determined by which direction wins in innovations: the one that makes nuclear weapons more invisible, or the one that makes them easier to detect.
Artificial intelligence adds a new layer of complexity to the situation. Its rapid scalability and ability to replace human expertise can accelerate the development of technologies supporting nuclear weapons. At the same time, AI challenges traditional forms of nuclear monitoring and inspections, upon which the current system relying on nuclear non-proliferation treaties largely builds.
The authors warn that decision-makers are at a critical juncture. If solutions that increase the invisibility of nuclear weapons advance faster than methods that strengthen surveillance, the current situation, limited to only nine nuclear-armed states, may become unstable. Understanding the role of AI in this technological race is, according to them, crucial for managing nuclear proliferation.
Source: Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Technological Arms Race for (In)visibility, ArXiv (AI).
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